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I. Introduction 
Has globalization changed inflation? There is little agreement on this issue. Kenneth Rogoff 
argues “that globalization – interacting with deregulation and privatization – has played a 
strong supporting role in the past decade’s disinflation” (Rogoff, 2003a, p. 54), which has 
reduced average global inflation from 30 percent in the early 1990s down to some 4 percent 
today. In contrast, Laurence Ball argues that “there is little reason to think that globalization 
has affected inflation significantly. ‘Modest’ and ‘limited’ probably overstate these effects.” 
(Ball, 2006, p. 1). These two opposite views are indicative of how severely the profession is 
split on this question. 
In the present context, the relevant definition of globalization is the increase in trade and 
financial openness – the two main channels through which it may have changed inflation 
according to theoretical considerations.
1 As Ball (2006) points out, the increase in openness to 
trade has been a gradual process, starting long before changes in inflation behaviour have 
been attributed to globalization. A more recent and pronounced phenomenon is the rapid 
increase in international capital flows: after a gradual increase since the early 1970s, both 
portfolio and foreign direct investment expanded rapidly since the early 1990s, outpacing the 
relatively modest increase in trade (see Lane and Milesi-Feretti, 2006). Against this 
background, it is noticeable, that – with few exceptions – the previous literature on inflation 
and openness has primarily considered the role of trade.  
In his seminal paper, Romer (1993) finds a negative link between openness to trade and 
inflation, using a large cross-section of 114 countries over the period 1973 to 1988 (though 
the effect of trade becomes insignificant, when only the subsample of OECD countries is 
considered). This finding is backed by a theoretical model, which shows that the output-
inflation tradeoff worsens if an economy opens up to trade, thereby reducing the incentive of 
                                                 
1 A further channel not considered in this paper is migration, which is emphasized in a recent model by Razin 
and Binyamini (2007).   3
monetary authorities to inflate. According to the standard time-inconsistency argument by 
Barro and Gordon (1983) this will show up in lower equilibrium inflation. In Romer (1993), 
the theoretical link between openness and inflation operates through a depreciation triggered 
by the effect of an output expansion on world prices. This negative terms of trade effect is 
larger in more open economies.  
Lane (1997) uses a small open economy model with nominal rigidities and imperfectly 
competitive goods markets in non-tradable sectors with sticky prices to show that a monetary 
expansion model will be associated with a real depreciation, even if world prices are 
unchanged. In empirical terms, using the Romer data he shows that the negative openness-
inflation link is strengthened and does also hold up for OECD countries, when country size is 
controlled for. More recent studies such as Gruben and McLeod (2004), who use a panel data 
approach to control for country-specific effects, have basically confirmed the negative 
relation between inflation and openness to trade. Using a similar approach, Gruben and 
McLeod (2002) also find measures of capital account restrictions to be negatively related to 
inflation for a large sample of countries. 
Nevertheless, the literature is not without ambiguities. In particular, it remains unclear 
through which channels openness affects inflation. At the heart of the models by Romer 
(1993) and Lane (1997) is a negative link between openness and the output-inflation tradeoff. 
Considering sacrifice ratios from 65 disinflation periods in 19 OECD countries from the 
period 1960 to 1991, which were calculated by Ball (1994), Temple (2002) fails to find a 
robust relation with openness. Even more puzzling, Daniels et al. (2005) – using the same 
dataset, shows that once central bank independence is controlled for, openness to trade has a 
significant positive effect on the sacrifice ratio. This finding cannot be reconciled with the 
negative effect of openness on inflation found by Romer and Lane; in their models, a larger 
sacrifice ratio would imply an increase in equilibrium inflation!    4
Two recent models, both exhibiting new Keynesian features such as wage rigidities and 
imperfect competition, have suggested an explanation for this apparent contradiction. Daniels 
and VanHoose (2006) embed the standard time inconsistency model in the framework of a 
multisector, imperfectly competitive open economy model, and show that openness to trade 
increases the sacrifice ratio but reduces the inflation bias.  
A further important paper by Razin and Loungani (2007), shows that both financial and 
trade openness reduce the relative weight attached to the output gap in the representative 
households utility based loss function in a new Keynesian open economy macro model. As a 
result, globalization tends to induce policy makers, guided by the representative household’s 
objective function, to putting greater emphasis on reducing inflation than on narrowing output 
gaps. Again this model suggests that greater openness (now both to trade and capital flows) 
increases the sacrifice ratio but lowers the inflation bias. Razin and Loungani (2007) also 
provide some tentative empirical evidence in favour of their model, regressing the sacrifice 
ratios by Ball (1994) on measures of capital and current account restrictions from Quinn 
(1997). While they find evidence for a positive link, it remains unclear whether there is a 
separate role for capital account restrictions (if included along with current account 
restrictions, only the latter variable remains significant). 
While the theoretical models by Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Razin and Loungani 
(2007) are appealing, a comprehensive empirical assessment is missing. Previous studies have 
either considered the effect of openness on inflation or the sacrifice ratio, but not both. 
Studies considering inflation only (such as Romer (1993), Lane (1997), McLeod (2002, 
2004)) cannot identify the transmission channel of the openness-inflation link. On the other 
hand, studies considering the effect on the sacrifice ratio (Daniels et al. (2005), Razin and 
Loungani (2007)) cannot rule out that a positive link of openness with the sacrifice ratio 
might be associated with higher inflation. Hence, both hypotheses should be tested on the 
same sample.    5
As far as financial openness is concerned, there is only little evidence. To our knowledge, 
there are only two studies, both of them looking at the effect of policy based variables (capital 
account restrictions) on inflation (Gruben and McLeod (2002) for a large panel of countries) 
and the sacrifice ratio (Razin and Loungani (2007) for the Ball dataset); results are somewhat 
inconclusive, in particular, if both current and capital account restrictions are considered.
2 
Moreover, no previous study has considered measures of de facto financial openness, in spite 
of the fact that a comprehensive and high quality dataset on financial openness has been 
developed over the last years by Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2006).  
A further drawback is that the vast majority of studies use data up to the end of the 1980s, 
thereby omitting potentially valuable information: Gruben and McLeod (2004) find that the 
(trade) openness-inflation link appears to have strengthened in the 1990s; a possible 
explanation that can be explored with our sample is that trade openness in their study may 
also capture the effects of financial openness, which has increased particularly strongly in the 
1990s. Finally, in most studies comparably little efforts have been devoted to addressing the 
likely endogeneity of both openness measures or to check instrument quality. 
This paper aims at closing this gap in the literature by undertaking a comprehensive 
reassessment using a large cross-section of 91 countries and more recent data from 1985 to 
2004. The same sample of countries is employed to assess the effect of openness on inflation 
and the output-inflation tradeoff, which allows us to design a more explicit model test. We 
consider financial openness and trade openness jointly, using both de jure (i.e. policy based) 
and de facto measures of openness, thereby paying careful attention to endogeneity concerns, 
instrument validity, and instrument quality.  
                                                 
2 In Razin and Loungani (2007), who use OLS, capital controls become insignificant if both variables are 
included. Gruben and McLeod (2002) argue that instrumenting for capital controls (using GDP and area) does 
not change the results (though they do not instrument for openness to trade).    6
The remainder of the paper has two main parts. Section II briefly reviews the theoretical 
background, sets up the empirical models and motivates our identification strategy. Section III 
presents the estimates of i) the effects of trade and financial openness on inflation, ii) the 
effects of trade and financial openness on the output-inflation tradeoff. The final section IV 
summarizes the results and concludes. 
 
II. Trade Openness, Financial Openness, the Output-Inflation Tradeoff and Inflation: 
Measurement and Identification 
1. Theoretical Background and Empirical Model 
Our empirical testing strategy is guided by two classes of models. A conclusion shared by all 
of them is that more open economies exhibit lower trend inflation. However, the two model 
classes differ with respect to their predictions concerning the relation between openness and 
the output-inflation trade off.   
In the first group of models (Romer (1993) and Lane (1997)), increased openness to trade 
lowers inflation by making the Phillips curve steeper, i.e. the output-inflation tradeoff 
smaller; underlying this mechanism is the negative terms of trade effect of a real depreciation, 
which is triggered by a monetary expansion. Romer’s model applies mainly to countries that 
are large enough to affect international prices. Lane (1997) shows that this is not a necessary 
assumption; using a model with imperfectly competitive goods markets and sticky prices in 
the non-tradeables sector he shows that the output gains from unexpected inflation are smaller 
in more open economies. Again, one would expect openness to be associated with lower 
inflation and a smaller output-inflation tradeoff. A further implication of Lane (1997) is that – 
for a given level of openness – the larger a country, the more reduces the terms of trade effect 
the benefits from surprise inflation. A negative effect of country size on inflation would point 
to the relevance of this effect.    7
The second class of models is provided by Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Razin and 
Loungani (2007). In the model by Daniel and VanHoose (2006), characterized by economy-
wide monopolistic competition, increased openness reduces the pricing power of domestic 
firms. As a consequence the output-inflation tradeoff becomes larger. At the same time, the 
reduced pricing power lowers the output effects, induced by unexpected price increases 
through a monetary expansion. Hence, one would expect openness to trade to be associated 
with lower inflation and a larger output-inflation tradeoff. Also note that the model predicts 
that a higher sensitivity of domestic spending with respect to a real depreciation reduces the 
output-inflation tradeoff but increases the inflation bias. In larger countries, where trade is a 
smaller share of domestic spending, terms of trade changes have lower output effects ceteris 
paribus. Hence, country size should reduce the inflation bias and increase the sacrifice ratio. 
The same implication follows from the theoretical model by Razin and Loungani (2007), 
which is an important contribution in two respects. First, by showing that increased openness 
reduces the relative weight attached to the output gap in the representative households utility 
based loss function, it provides another link through which openness lowers the inflation bias: 
reduced correlation between fluctuations of the output gap and consumption in more open 
economies. Second, it shows that this effect materializes both through increased openness to 
trade (by specialization in production and diversification of consumption) as well as increased 
openness to capital flows (by allowing households to smooth consumption). This enriches the 
testable hypotheses: both trade and financial openness should be negatively related to 
inflation and positively related to the output-inflation tradeoff. 
The first empirical model, emerging from these theoretical considerations, relates 
inflation (π) to openness (OPEN) – trade openness (OPEN
Trade), financial openness (Open
Fin) 
or both, country size, which we measures in terms of population (Pop) and area, and a set of 
control variables (X):  
  u Area Pop OPEN + + + + + = γX ln ln ln 3 2 1 0 α α α α π    (1)   8
Following previous studies (e.g. Romer (1993), the following controls will be included: 
central bank independence (CBI) as well as political instability (PINST) to account for the 
institutional environment; and (initial) real GDP per worker (RGDPWOK) as indicator of 
economic development, which might capture a variety of factors affecting inflation. 
Consequently,  X = [CBI, PINST, lnRGDPWOK].  
It should be added that a negative link between trade openness and inflation is consistent 
with all models discussed above. However, establishing a robust link between inflation and 
financial openness would be supportive of the model by Razin and Loungani (2007), which is 
the first to deliver a thorough foundation for this relationship.  
The testing strategy can be sharpened by considering the effect of openness (and size) on 
the output-inflation tradeoff. The predictions regarding this relationship – taking a negative 
effect of openness on inflation as given – discriminate between the two classes of models: 
The traditional models by Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) predict a negative relationship 
between trade openness and the output-inflation tradeoff, whereas the models by Daniels and 
VanHoose (2006) and Razin and Loungani (2007) predict a positive relationship. Razin and 
Loungani (2007), in addition, postulate a positive link between the output-inflation tradeoff 
and financial openness. Moreover, country size should have a negative effect on the output-
inflation tradeoff according to Lane (1997) and a positive effect according to Daniels and 
VanHoose (2006). 
Hence, the second class of models we are going to test relates the output-inflation 
tradeoff (θ) to openness – again trade and (or) financial openness, and country size:  
  ε β β β β θ + + + + + = δW Area Pop OPEN ln ln 3 2 1 0 . (2) 
The matrix W is a set of control variables, whose choice is guided by Ball et al. (1988), who 
find both theoretically and empirically that mean inflation and the variability of aggregate 
demand are negatively related to the output-inflation trade-off: The reason is that higher mean   9
inflation and more variable demand cause firms to adjust prices more frequently, making 
prices more flexible. As a result, nominal shocks have lower real effects, leading to a lower 
output-inflation tradeoff. Hence, two controls will be included: mean inflation (π) and the 
variability of aggregate demand (σ
AD), measured as standard deviation of the log differenced 
nominal GDP series, i.e. W = [π, σ
AD].  
We will use a cross-section of 91 countries over the period 1985-2004 to estimate models 
(1) and (2). A more detailed description of the sample, the variables and data sources is given 
in section 2. Note that any testing strategy with an aim to discriminate between the two 
classes of models described above, has to be based on the estimation of both models (1) and 
(2). A negative effect of openness on inflation does not reveal the transmission channels of 
this relationship. Looking at the output-inflation tradeoff alone is not sufficient, since a larger 
output-inflation tradeoff could be associated with higher inflation (e.g. in Romer, 1993) or 
lower inflation (e.g. in Daniels and VanHoose, 2006). So far, no empirical study has 
simultaneously considered these two issues for the same sample of countries and time period.  
 
2. Measurement and Data 
2.1 Inflation and the Output-Inflation Tradeoff 
Measurement of inflation is straightforward; we follow the standard approach using the log of 
the average annual change in the log of the GDP deflator. As an alternative measure, we will 
also consider the log of the average annual change in the log of the consumer price index (see 
section II, subsection 3).  
A much more difficult task is to measure output-inflation tradeoffs, i.e. the 
responsiveness of output to prices, or the sacrifice ratio, defined as ratio of output losses to the 
reduction in trend inflation over a disinflation. The two measures are clearly related. Ceteris 
paribus, a larger sensitivity of output with respect to changes in the price level is associated   10
with a larger sacrifice ratio.
3 I a narrower sense, however, the sacrifice ratio is restricted to 
disinflation episodes (which might differ from the benefice ratio, i.e. the output gains from 
inflating, see Jordan (1997)). Ball (1994) has calculated sacrifice ratios from 65 disinflation 
periods in 19 OECD countries and de facto all studies on the link between openness and the 
sacrifice ratio have employed this data set. While the Ball measures are appealing due to its 
careful calculation, they have also been criticized (see the comment by Cecchetti (1994)).  
From a practical point of view, a serious limitation of the Ball dataset is that it covers 
only OECD countries and the period from 1960 to 1991. This conflicts with our goal to use a 
large cross-section of countries. Even more importantly, as West (2007) points out in his 
comment on the empirical test by Razin and Loungani (2007), according to the theoretical 
model, there is no particular reason to focus on disinflations. The same holds true for the other 
models underlying our analysis. As a consequence we will focus on the average output-
inflation tradeoffs. 
We opt for a simple approach, which has been widely used to estimate average output-
inflation tradeoffs across countries, e.g. by Lucas (1972) and Ball et al. (1988). It is based on 
a regression of real GDP (Y
R) on its lag, a time trend (t) and the growth of nominal GDP (Y):  
  υ θ ω ω ω + ∆ + + + = − Y t Y Y
R R ln ln ln 2 1 1 0 . (3) 
Equation (3) is estimated for each country for our sample period from 1985 to 2004 (or – for a 
few countries – for slightly shorter subperiods due to restrictions on data availability). The 
                                                 
3 Looking at it another way, one could also say that the Phillips curve flatter. However, a “Phillips curve 
interpretation” does not really apply in the present context. In the standard Barro-Gordon model, the output 
inflation trade-off arises from the aggregate supply curve, which is in turn obtained by aggregating the supply 
curves of profit maximizing, price taking firms. There is a clear link to Phillips curve. In the model by Daniels 
and VanHoose (2006) with imperfect competition there is no aggregate supply curve (and thus no standard 
Phillips curve); in this model the output-inflation trade-off is governed by the relation between aggregate output 
produced by profit maximizing, price setting firms and the overall level of prices they set.    11
parameter θ measures the output inflation trade-off. If it is zero, nominal shocks show up 
completely in prices; if it is one, prices are completely rigid, such that nominal shocks 
translate into proportionate changes of real GDP. To put it another way: the larger θ, the 
stronger the responsiveness of output to changes in the price level.  
The main advantage of this approach is its simplicity and that the data requirements are 
not demanding; nominal and real GDP data are available for a large cross-section of 
countries. At the same time, equation (3) is well founded through the theoretical model by 
Ball et al. (1988). Nevertheless, it should be noted that this estimation approach is not without 
problems; in particular, the time series properties of the variables in (3) may give rise to some 
non-stationarity concerns (though time series and panel unit root test yield ambiguous 
results). Still, this appears to be the most suitable approach to obtain estimates for a large 
cross-section of countries, and while the point estimates should not be overstressed they 
should be indicative of the cross-country variation in average output-inflation trade-offs for 
our sample. 
Our estimates suggest that there is considerable variation in output-inflation tradeoffs 
across countries, ranging from –0.449 to 0.997. Of our 91 estimated output-inflation tradeoffs, 
17 (that is 18 percent) take a negative value. Comparing our results with those of Ball et al. 
(1988), who estimate the same equation for 43 countries over the period 1948 to 1986, 10 of 
their 43 coefficients (23 percent) are negative. The average of our estimates is 0.31, theirs is 
0.24. Finally, the correlation between their estimated tradeoffs and ours amounts to 0.44. 
 
2.2. Measures of Globalization 
In this paper globalization is used to denote the increase in trade and financial integration. 
Basically, there are two approaches to measure integration. One can use de facto measures of 
integration, focussing on policy outcomes or on de jure measure of integration, i.e. policy 
variables. Since trade and capital account policy affect inflation through their effect on   12
openness, de facto measures provide a more direct way to test this relationship. Temple 
(2002, p. 455) argues that “predictions of the theory are based on the importance of trade 
relative to GDP, not trade policy, so throughout this paper ‘openness’ should be interpreted in 
the former sense.” A similar point can be made for financial openness.  
Consistent with this line of argument, most previous studies on trade openness use the 
import share in real GDP and omit policy variables; in contrast, the view studies on financial 
openness use solely policy measures, mainly based on Quinn (1997), who derives measures 
for restrictions on the current and capital account by translating qualitative IMF descriptions 
into quantitative measures using certain coding rules. For both variables, labelled Current and 
Capital, a higher value points to fewer restrictions.  
In line with the argumentation by Temple (2002), our main approach will be to use de 
facto measures of integration: as basic measure of openness to trade we use real exports plus 
imports as share of GDP. An advantage of this variable over the import share used in most 
previous studies is that comparable figures in real terms are available for a more 
comprehensive sample through the Penn World Tables. But the correlation between 
OPEN
Trade and Imports is 0.91, suggesting that the choice makes little difference. We will 
return to this point below in the robustness analysis (section III, subsection 3).  
We measure financial openness in terms of total foreign assets and liabilities as share of 
GDP, which we calculate from the dataset by Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2006). They construct 
estimates of external assets and liabilities for 145 countries over the period 1970–2004 
(distinguishing between foreign direct investment, portfolio equity investment, official 
reserves, and external debt). Surprisingly, none of the studies on financial openness and 
inflation has considered this standard measure of financial openness using the Lane and 
Milesi-Feretti dataset so far.  
Regarding functional form, there is no theoretical guide as to whether use levels or logs. 
The results are very similar both in terms of statistical significance and average elasticities of   13
the openness variables; ultimately, we opted for the use of the variables in levels since this 
yielded a slightly better goodness of fit. In addition, this makes our results easier comparable 
with previous studies, most of which adopted a level approach. 
Of course, we would also like to know to what extent policy is affecting inflation. The 
question will be addressed using the policy variables as instruments for de facto openness 
measures in a two stages least squares estimation, consistent with the theoretical  assumption 
that current and capital account policy affect inflation through their effect on openness – in 
econometric terms, through the first stage regression. The assumptions required for this 
approach to be valid are discussed more in detail below.  
 
2.3 Central Bank Independence and Political Instability 
We use the most common measure of central bank independence by Cukierman et al. (1992); 
it is an index between 0 and 1 (maximum independence), which is based on an aggregation of 
16 characteristics of central bank charters which are related to the independence of central 
banks from the exertion of political power. They provide data for some 70 countries by 
decade from 1940 to the 1980s. Polillo and Guillén (2005) have extended this measure for 
many of the countries for the period from 1990 to 2000.  
Regarding political instability many previous studies use data from the Barro-Lee dataset, 
based on the number of revolutions or assassinations. Since their data on these variables end 
in the 1980s, we use an alternative variable: government crisis, defined as rapidly developing 
situations that threaten to bring the downfall of the present regime, which is based on the 
Cross National Times Series Data Archive and employed by Aisen and Veiga (2005). It is 
available for all countries of our sample up to 1999. 
   14
2.4 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
The approach pursued here is to use a possibly large cross-section of countries, referring to 
the time period from 1985 to 2004. Our most comprehensive sample, for which the main 
variables (inflation and openness) and the “core control variables” (size, real GDP per worker, 
and political instability) are available, comprises 91 countries.
4 Including measures of capital 
and current account restrictions reduces our sample to 73 countries; measures of central bank 
independence are available for only 47 countries. All variables used in the estimation of our 
cross section models are period averages (except Z
Open which refers to 1990 and initial real 
GDP per worker which refers to 1985). A detailed list of countries, and a description of the 
variables and data sources is given in Appendix A1. 
Our 91 country sample shares 88 countries with the 113 countries in Romer (1993); the 
three countries not included in the Romer study are China, Hungary, and Chad. Regarding the 
time dimension our sample refers to the period 1985 to 2004; that is, it actually starts where 
the time periods in many of the other studies (such as Romer, 1993; Lane 1997; but also the 
studies based on the Ball dataset) end.  
  < Table 1 here > 
Table 1 summarizes the properties of the key variables. There is considerable variation in the 
average inflation rates, which range from 1.3 to 45.4 percent. Also the pairwise correlations 
are indicative: more liberal current and capital account policies are associated with more trade 
and higher stocks of foreign assets and liabilities; both the policy based measures and the de 
facto measures of openness are negatively correlated with inflation and positively correlated 
with the output-inflation tradeoff. Central bank independence is negatively related with 
                                                 
4 Countries that experienced financial crises or hyperinflations in our period of investigation were excluded from 
the sample right from the beginning (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Congo, Nicaragua and Peru). Moreover, Japan 
with an average inflation close to zero turned out as influential outlier and was excluded from the sample.   15
inflation, political instability shows a positive relationship. The scatter plots in Figures 1 and 
2 highlight the potentially important roles of trade openness and financial openness in 
explaining the cross-country variation in inflation performance.  
  < Figure 1 here > 
  < Figure 2 here > 
3. Endogeneity Concerns, Identification, and Instrument Quality 
While the prima-facie evidence in section 2 is suggestive it does not tell us anything about 
causality. One complication in the estimation is that our variables of main interest, i.e. trade 
and financial openness are likely to be endogenous. For trade, this point has already been 
made by Romer (1993)
5. Similar concerns apply to financial openness: Low inflation 
countries, for example, may be viewed as more attractive by investors and thus have higher 
capital inflows, both in the form of portfolio and direct investments.  
Hence, it will be important to test for endogeneity and to check whether the results hold 
up if the model is estimated using instrumental variable (IV) techniques. Romer (1993) 
suggests using country size as instrument for openness to trade. This is no feasible approach 
in our setting: According to the theoretical models we refer to, country size is an important 
control variable in the main regression (both according to Lane (1997) but also indirectly 
through the exchange rate sensitivity of domestic demand according to Daniels and VanHoose 
(2006)); consequently, size is no longer available as an instrument. The approach pursued by 
Lane (1997) is to use the openness measure by Lee (1993), which is obtained by forming 
                                                 
5 As example, how this could generate a negative correlation between inflation and openness, Romer argues that 
countries adopting protectionist policies (i.e. are relatively closed) may also adopt other policies favouring 
particular interest groups; this could lead to large budget deficits and hence to high rates of inflation (Romer 
1993, p. 885)   16
fitted values from a regression of openness on area, distance, tariffs, and the black market 
premium. Since policy variables are included in this construction, is it unlikely to purge the 
endogeneity from the variable.  
Frankel and Romer (1999) suggest a more convincing instrument for trade openness, 
which exploits the exogeneity of geography. It is an aggregate measure of distance 
(“proximity”), calculated from the predicted values of a gravity model that includes 
geographical variables only. The identifying assumption is that geography has no direct effect 
on trade (in the present context: inflation), once country size (in terms of population and area) 
is controlled for. No study on the link between inflation and trade has employed this 
instrument so far. Frankel and Rose (2002) have updated the Frankel and Romer (1999) 
instrument for a large cross-section of countries; their estimates refer to 1990, which is close 
to our sample midpoint. We will use their estimates as instrument for trade openness and refer 
to it as Z
Open. 
Moreover, we argue that the same reasoning can be used to construct an instrument for 
financial openness. Guerin (2006) has shown that the gravity model works well not only for 
trade but also for FDI and portfolio investment and that geography plays a significant role in 
determining the spatial allocation of trade, FDI and portfolio investment. It would suggest 
itself to parallel the construction of the Frankel and Romer instrument, using bilateral 
financial flows as dependent variable in a geographical gravity model. Unfortunately, there is 
not sufficient data for our large cross-section of countries. Consequently, we use the same 
instrument (Z
Open) for both trade and financial openness.
6 Hence, in the simplest case, our first 
stage regressions will be given by  
                                                 
6 A drawback is that we cannot identify the effects of trade and financial openness separately in one equation. 
However, even if sufficient data were available, this instrument for financial openness would certainly be highly 
correlated with the trade instrument, such that an attempt to identify the separate effects of trade and financial 
openness in one equation by these two instruments would almost certainly run into a weak instruments problem.   17
  υ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ + + + + = Area Pop Z OPEN
OPEN Trade ln ln 3 2 1 0 , and   (4a) 
  η κ κ κ κ + + + + = Area Pop Z OPEN
OPEN Fin ln ln 3 2 1 0 .   (4b) 
Depending on the specification of the main model, further exogenous variables from the 
second stage regression will have to be included in (4a) and (4b).  As a first indication of the 
relevance of the instrument, we note that - as can be seen from Table 1 – the correlation 
between Z
Open and OPEN
Trade (OPEN
Fin) is 0.71 (0.57).   
Razin and Loungani (2007) use least squares in their regression of the sacrifice ratio on 
current and capital account restrictions, arguing that (the initial values of the) policy based 
variables may be viewed as predetermined. This is a debatable assumption, of course, but if 
one is willing to join this argument, one could follow their example and use policy based 
variables directly, or – the approach we will purse – include the policy based variables as 
instruments in the first stage regression.  
  υ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ + + + + + = Current Area Pop Z OPEN
OPEN Trade
4 3 2 1 0 ln ln , and   (5a) 
  η κ κ κ κ κ + + + + + = Capital Area Pop Z OPEN
OPEN Fin
4 3 2 1 0 ln ln .   (5b) 
Apart from linking openness to geography and policy through the first stage regression, 
another advantage is that the model becomes overidentified; under the maintained assumption 
that geography is exogenous in the present context, which is relatively innocuous, this allows 
us to check the exogeneity of the policy variables by testing for overidentifying restrictions. 
To give a first impression of instrument quality, we note that the correlation between 
Open
Trade (Open
Fin) and Current (Capital) is 0.21 (0.48). 
Instrument validity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for two stages least 
estimates to produce reliable estimates. Recent work (e.g. Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock, 
Wright, and Yogo, 2002; Andrews, Moreira, and Stock, 2004) has shown that the use of two 
stages least squares with ‘weak’ instruments may lead to estimates with large bias and size 
distortions. Hence, it will be important to check instrument quality. We have already shown   18
that the instruments are reasonably correlated with the endogenous variables. A more relevant 
issue is the partial correlation of our instruments with the endogenous variables, controlling 
for the exogenous regressors in our main equation.  
In order to check the quality of the instruments we will use the test developed by Stock 
and Yogo (2004). They provide critical values, depending on the number of endogenous 
variables and the number of instruments, to test the null that the quality of the instruments is 
below a certain level in terms of the maximum tolerable size distortion of a conventional 
Wald test and – for overidentified models – also in terms of the maximum tolerable bias 
relative to OLS. They provide four critical values depending on the quality level (tolerable 
bias, size distortion). Hence the null is that the quality of the instruments is below that of a 
pre-specified level. For the case of one endogenous regressor, the Stock-Yogo test is simply 
the F-statistic on excluding the instrument(s) in the first stage regression. For models with two 
(or more) endogenous variables, the these F-statistics are only indicative, since even if the 
instruments are strongly related to the endogenous variables, the predicted values from the 
first stage regressions may be highly collinear. Stock and Yogo (2004) suggest using the 
Cragg-Donald statistic, a matrix analog to the F-statistic in the first stage regression, and also 
provide the critical values to test for weak instruments. For exactly identified models and 
models with one overidentifying restriction, as it is the case throughout this paper, critical 
values are only available for he size criterion.
7  
                                                 
7 For two stages least squares, the critical values corresponding to the four quality levels ( lowest to highest) are: 
5.53, 6.66, 8.96, and 16.38 (one endogenous variable, one instrument); 7.25, 8.75, 11.59, and 19.93 (one 
endogenous variable, two instruments). For two endogenous variables, and three instruments (Cragg-Donald 
test), the critical values are: 5.45, 6.40. 8.18, and 13.43 (Stock and Yogo, 2004, p. 40).   19
III. Estimation Results  
1. Openness and Inflation 
We start from the most parsimonious variant of model (1), relating inflation to trade and 
financial openness, respectively, as well as country size. We then successively add three 
control variables to the regression: first, political instability and real GDP per worker, which 
are available for the full sample. Then we include central bank independence, which reduces 
our sample to 47 countries. 
 
1.1 Separate Results for Trade Openness and Financial Openness  
Table 2 and Table 3 show both the least squares and IV results for the effect of trade and 
financial openness on inflation, using Z
Open as instrument. The last column shows also the two 
stages least squares (2SLS) estimates, using both Z
Open and Current (Capital) as instruments. 
In most models, the Hausman test rejects the orthogonality of error term with openness. This 
result is certainly also due to the fact that the “other openness” variable is not included in the 
main model: For example, in the models including trade openness (Table 2), financial 
openness is omitted (and its effect thus captured by the error term) and vice versa. Since the 
two openness measures are correlated, we would expect the Hausman test to reject 
exogeneity.  
Moreover, since the instrument Z
Open is correlated with both openness measures, both the 
least sqaures and the IV estimates of the parameter of trade openness are likely to be upward 
biased, capturing the effects of financial openness on inflation as well. But the IV estimates 
are still informative, since they eliminate the (possible) bias induced by the omission of 
relevant variables other than financial openness, as well as the bias due to simultaneity and 
measurement error. The same reasoning applies to Table 3 where trade openness is omitted.  
< Table 2 here >   20
< Table 3 here > 
Note that the F-tests from the first stage regressions given at the bottom of the Table do not 
point to a weak instruments problem. Even in the worst cases – these are the two stages least 
squares estimates where Current (Capital) are used as additional instruments – we can reject 
the null that instrument quality is below the lowest (second lowest) level respectively. In most 
other models we can even reject that instrument quality is below the highest level.  
The IV estimates suggest that both openness measures have a negative and sizeable effect 
on inflation. On average, an increase in trade (financial) openness by one percentage point 
leads to a (relative) decrease in inflation by 1.1 (0.36) percent. Comparing our results for 
Open
Trade with that of other studies using large cross-sections, this is roughly half the effect 
obtained by Romer (1993) accounting for the differences in the definition of the openness 
variables (Romer uses the import share whereas we include exports as well). This is plausible 
in light of the fact that Romer omits country size. The magnitudes of our coefficients are very 
similar to that obtained by Lane (1997) who adds country size (in terms of GDP) to the 
Romer model. Results are less easily to compare with the specification by Gruben and 
McLeod (2004), but their estimated effect of openness turns out clearly lower; this is not 
surprising, since they use a panel approach, which allows them to control for country-specific 
effects and since they use a specification with 5 years spans, which is likely to miss some long 
run effects.  
The role of size is difficult to judge, since the results differ across models. Focusing on an 
increase in both measures, i.e. an increase in size holding population density constant, there is 
weak evidence for a negative effect of size on inflation, but the joint p-value of both area and 
population is hardly below conventional significance levels. 
Turning to the results for the control variables, political instability (government crises) 
shows the expected sign but is insignificant in all models. Central bank independence mainly 
shows the wrong (positive) sign but is insignificant in all models at conventional levels. This   21
apparently surprising result can be explained by its relation with real GDP per worker 
(RGDPWOK). As Romer (1993) argues, RGDPWOK as a general indicator of economic 
development may capture various other influences on inflation. Central bank independence 
appears to be one of them: The correlation between RGDPWOK and CBI is 0.41 (see Table 
1); in fact, when RGDPWOK is excluded, CBI becomes negative in many models although it 
remains insignificant at conventional levels. Since the role of central bank independence is 
not of primary interest in this paper, we do not pursue this issue further here, but we will 
continue to include CBI (along with RGDPWOK) as control variable.  
 
1.2 Results for Models Including Both Variables Simultaneously 
One important message we take from the separate estimates is that the least squares estimates 
are downward biased (compared with our IV estimates); still the separate estimates, both least 
squares and IV, may exhibit an upward bias after all, since the coefficient will also capture the 
effect of the other openness variable.  
  < Table 4 > 
The first two columns in Table 4 show the least squares estimates of model (1), including 
both openness measures, with political instability and real GDP per worker as controls. The 
estimates point to a significant effect of each openness variable on inflation. To account for 
the likely endogeneity of both variables, we estimate the model by two stages least squares 
(2SLS), using Capital and Current as instruments in addition to Z
Open. Notice first, that the 
Hausman test does not reject exogeneity any more, in contrast with the models where only 
one openness measures was included. There are two possible interpretations: One might argue 
that the model excluding the “other” openness measure is misspecified and that the 
endogeneity issues is resolved, once the effect of the other openness variable is “taken out of 
the error term” and included in the main model. This would imply that there are no other   22
relevant omitted variables and that reverse causality or measurement error are not an issue 
here. Alternatively, one could argue that the failure to reject exogeneity is due to a low power 
of the Hausman test, given that the partial correlation between the additional instruments 
(Capital and Current) and the openness measures is fairly small.  
The second column gives the 2SLS estimates; both openness measures remain negative 
and have approximately the same coefficient; but as expected the standard errors becomes 
fairly large such that the coefficients are rendered insignificant.
8 In terms of the Stock-Yogo 
test, the Cragg-Donald statistic is 1.83, i.e. we cannot reject the null that instrument quality is 
below the lowest level. Hence, instrument quality is too weak to produce reliable results. A 
possible answer to this problem is to use limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) 
estimation, which – as Stock and Yogo (2004) show – is far superior to 2SLS in the presence 
of weak instruments. But even if we use the critical values for LIML estimation, the Cragg-
Donald statistic does not reject the null that instrument quality is below the lowest level 
(critical value: 3.09). And as expected, the qualitative results do not change when the model is 
estimated by LIML.  
Still, we believe that the estimates suggest that both openness measures are relevant, 
which is particularly supported by the Hausman test. Consequently, both variables should be 
properly included in the main model. The problem is that we have only one good instrument 
for two endogenous variables. In order to resolve this issue, we proceed with a restricted 
variant of model (1). In particular, we assume that the parameters of the two openness 
variables are equal, which appears to be justified by a visual inspection of the two 
coefficients. More formally, we cannot reject the null that the parameters of Open
Trade and 
                                                 
8 The least squares estimates are shown for a larger sample (91 countries), since the two instruments Capital and 
Current are only available for a smaller subsample of 73 countries. For the comparison of the estimates, this is 
not relevant in the present cases, since the least squares estimates for the 73-coutnry sample are de facto identical 
to that for the 91-country sample.   23
Open
Fin are equal, not even at the the 10 percent level, irrespective whether the models is 
estimated least squares or 2SLS.
9  
Columns three and four of Table 4 show the least squares and IV results of the restricted 
models, using Z
Open as instrument for Open
Trade and Open
Fin. The compound openness 
measure turns out significant at the one percent level now. This holds true in the next two 
columns as well, where CBI is included as control. Notice, that the Hausman test still does not 
reject exogeneity, despite the fact that the instrument Z
Open is of high quality. In terms of the 
F-statistics from the first stage regression, we can always at least reject that instrument quality 
is below the second highest level. As expected, including Capital and Current as additional 
instruments would weaken instrument quality (see the last column for the model including 
CBI, where the two policy measures are included in the first stage regression). Nevertheless, a 
noteworthy result (which, of course, has to be judged against the weak instrument quality) is 
that the OID test does not reject the orthogonality of Capital and Current with the error term. 
 
 2. Openness and the Output-Inflation Tradeoff 
We now turn to the results for model (2). The details for the estimates using the two openness 
measures separately are given in the Appendix (see Table A2.1 and A2.2), but they can be 
summarized succinctly as follows. Both openness measures are positively related to the 
output-inflation tradeoff (though this relationship will also capture indirect effects, e.g. of 
Open
Trade on θ through Open
Fin). In the (small sample) models including CBI, the p-value of 
Open
Trade is slightly above the 10 percent level. Exogeneity is rejected in most models and the 
least square estimates are downward biased. Instrument quality is fine, and – as before – 
                                                 
9 One could ask whether this is justifiable in light of the fact that the coefficients are similar when both variables 
are included but rather different when the variables are included separately. For the ceteris paribus effects of 
both variables to be the same, these results require that financial openness is stronger related to trade openness 
than trade openness to financial openness, which is not implausible in our view.    24
including  Current and Capital only weakens instrument quality. The controls (level of 
inflation, variability of aggregate demand) show the expected negative sign though they are 
not always significant. 
  < Table 5 > 
We now turn to the results, when both openness variables are included in the model. Column 
1 in Table 5 gives the least squares estimates without controls except country size. The 
coefficient of financial openness is positive and statistically significant; the coefficient of 
trade openness is insignificant, however. This holds up for all variants of the models. As 
before, the problem is that we cannot instrument both variables using Z
Open, Current, and 
Capital; instrument quality is too low to yield reliable results (the Cragg-Donald statistics is 
2.539, which is clearly below the critical value for the lowest quality level). The 2SLS results 
are given in the second column; as expected the standard errors become very large. Again 
LIML estimation is no feasible way out and produces qualitatively similar results.  
We proceed with a restricted variant of model (2), which appears to be justifiable in the 
present context as well, given that the null the parameters of Open
Trade and Open
Fin are equal 
cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level, neither in least squares nor in the 2SLS estimation. 
(The same holds true when controls are included). Columns three and four show the least 
squares and IV estimates (using Z
Open as only instrument) with the level of inflation and the 
variability of aggregate demand included as controls. Instrument quality is fine (we can easily 
reject that instrument quality is below the highest level) and the joint openness measure turns 
out positively significant at the 10 percent level. This result holds up for the smaller sample 
with  CBI included. (For completeness, we also show the 2SLS results with Current and 
Capital included as additional instruments). 
As far as country size is concerned, the joint effect of population and area is positive but 
rarely significant. Mean inflation has significant negative effect as expected, whereas the   25
variability of aggregate demand shows the expected sign but is insignificant. Finally, as in the 
model for inflation, we do not find a significant effect of CBI on the output-inflation tradeoff. 
Some doubts remain on the independent role of Open
Trade in this equation. Neverthelss, 
our reading of the results is that that trade openness and financial openness are both relevant 
determinants of the output-inflation tradeoff: First, the hypothesis that the coefficients are 
equal cannot be rejected. Second, from the separate estimates we conclude that Open
Trade is 
downward biased, which may explain the insignificant results. Third, the results are consistent 
with that of the model using inflation as dependent variable. Finally, the Hausman test often 
rejects when one of the openness variables is omitted, while it does not when both Open
Trade 
and Open
Fin are included: This suggests that both variables are relevant in the main model. 
Finally, it is hard to believe for theoretical reasons that financial openness matters but trade 
openness does not, given that both variables are motivated by a similar model framework. 
As far as size is concerned, results are similar to the regressions for inflation. Size tends 
to be positively related to the output-inflation tradeoff, but in most specifications only 
population or area are weakly significant and the two size variables are hardly significantly 
jointly.  
While the negative effect of openness on inflation is consistent with all theoretical models 
discussed above, the significant positive effect of openness (as well as the weak positive 
effect of size) on the output-inflation tradeoff is at odds with the models by Romer (1993) and 
Lane (1997) but supportive to the models by Daniels and VanHoose (2005) and Razin and 
Loungani (2007); the latter model receives strong support for the fact that it provides the only 
rigorous motivation for an effect of financial openness, which turns out particularly strong.  
 
3. Robustness 
In Table 6 we show the results for alternative specifications of model (1) with RGDPWOK 
and  PINST included as controls. As before, adding CBI does not change the qualitative   26
conclusions such that the results can be regarded as representative. Moreover, we show only 
the results of the IV estimates, using Z
Open as instrument; throughout the least squares 
estimates show smaller standard errors, lower p-values and a better fit. We focus on the 
relationship between inflation and openness here (model 1); results of the corresponding 
robustness analysis for model (2) relating openness and the output-inflation trade off are very 
similar and thus relegated to the Appendix (see Table A2.3).  
  < Table 6 >   
We start by considering alternative measures of openness. So far, we have used the broadest 
measures of trade and financial openness (imports plus exports as well as total foreign assets 
and liabilities as share of GDP). As mentioned before, this choice is motivated partly by the 
availability of better data, and also by the fact that it improves instrument the quality of our 
instrument Z
Open, in particular with respect to Open
Fin. A possible drawback is that this choice 
implies a slight departure from the theoretical models underlying the empirical analysis. 
Regarding trade openness, most models focus on imports (marginal propensity to import), 
though the transmission channel in Razin and Loungani (2007) (diversification of production, 
specialization, and the implied mismatch with the structure of consumption) can also be 
measured from the export side. As far as financial openness is concerned, the channel through 
which it affects inflation according to Razin and Loungani (2007) is that it allows consumer 
to smooth consumption. Thus, FDI assets and liabilities, which are included in our measure 
Open
Fin, are hardly relevant in this context.  
To check the sensitivity of this choice, the first two columns in Table 6 show that IV 
estimates of models (1), using the import share as measure of Open
Trade, and narrower 
measures of financial openness for Open
Fin, defined as portfolio equity and debt assets plus 
liabilities as share of GDP. As can be seen, the results hold up: both openness measures show 
an economically and statistically significant effect on inflation. Considering the model, where   27
only trade in terms of imports is included, the results are very close to that of Lane (1997), 
whose main estimates also range around the value of -2.  
If both variables are included, results are the same as for the more general measures: 
Open
Fin remains significant at the one percent level, while Open
Trade becomes insignificant. 
Again, the hypothesis that the parameters are equal cannot be rejected, such that we use a 
restricted variant of model (1). Column three shows the corresponding results: the narrower 
compound openness measure turns out significant again.  
We next consider, whether the use of a CPI based inflation measure instead of the GDP 
deflator makes any difference. Column four of Table 6 shows the estimates (for the restricted 
model using both openness measures). Again, the results hold up; in fact, the significance 
level of the openness measures improves.  
We now turn to the analysis of subsample stability, both with respect to the time and the 
cross-section dimension. First, we spilt the time span used so far (1985 to 2004) into two 
subperiods: 1985-1994 and 1995-2004. As shown in columns five and six, the openness 
measure is still significant, though its effect appears to have fallen in the 1990s. This is in 
contrast with the results by Gruben and McLeod (2004) who argue that the link has 
strengthened. The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is that their estimates also 
capture the effects of financial openness with has strengthened in the 1990s.  
While we have checked our results for outliers, we also rerun the regression, excluding 
all countries with an average inflation larger than 30 percent. Results for this reduced sample 
of 85 countries are essentially unchanged as can be seen from column 7 in Table 6.  
Finally, we check whether results hold up if we focus on the 25 OECD countries 
contained in our sample. As can be seen in the last column of Table 6 the inflation-openness 
link gets lost. The small number of observations and the weak instrument quality does not 
appear to be the reason; the same result is obtained when the models is estimated least 
squares, where the p-value of the openness variable is 0.47. Similarly, again if Open
Trade and   28
Open
Fin are included separately, no significant effect on inflation can be found irrespective 
whether the model is estimated by IV or least squares. This result is enforced by the fact that 
the same result holds up for the analysis of the link between the output-inflation tradeoff and 
openness. And for completeness, we add that including CBI makes no difference as well.  
Our results call into question that globalization has significantly affected the inflation 
performance of highly developed OECD countries, supporting the view of Ball (2006). The 
most likely explanation already suggested by Romer (1993) is that for our timer period 
considered, the time inconsistency problem has been successfully resolved by this small 
group of countries though the creation of a proper institutional framework for central bank 
behaviour.  
Notice, that this finding is in contrast with the results by Daniels et al. (2006), who 
identify a positive link between trade openness and the sacrifice ratio for OECD countries, 
and also with those of Lane (1997), where the negative effect of trade openness on inflation 
holds up for the OECD subsample. Results are not easy to compare due to differences in the 
specification: Daniels et al. (2006), for example, focus on disinflations using the Ball (1994) 
dataset and do not control for country size; Lane (1997) uses a different measure of country 
size (GDP) and other instrumental variables (see the discussion in section II, subsection 3). 
Nevertheless, in our view the most appealing explanation for the discrepancy of our results 
with those of previous studies is the different time period considered: Daniels et al. (2006) 
used data from disinflation episodes between 1960 to 1991; the cross-section used by Lane 
(1997) covers the time period from 1973 to 1988, whereas our sample refers to the more 
recent period from 1985 to 2004. It is not implausible to assume that – at least most of the 
OECD countries considered – the attitudes of central banks have strongly shifted to towards 
maintaining low inflation (vs. stabilizing the output gap or stimulating activity) over the last 
decades, with the consequence that otherwise relevant determinants of the inflation bias (such 
as openness) do not play a role any more in shaping central bank behaviour.   29
At the same time, the differences of our result to that of previous studies suggest that it 
might an interesting avenue for future research to develop a larger set of estimates of output-
inflation tradeoffs and to look for systematic differences in the effect of openness on inflation 
between groups of countries and with respect to disinflation vs. inflation periods. Another 
interesting issue to be addressed in future research would be to provide an empirical 
assessment of the effects of migration on inflation, a third important channel through which 
globalization may have affected inflation performance according to the recent model by Razin 
and Binyamini (2007). 
 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper provides comprehensive empirical evidence for a link between globalization and 
inflation, using a large cross-section of countries covering the period 1985-2004. Endogeneity 
concerns are address in a instrumental variable procedure, exploiting the exogeneity of 
geography to identify the ceteris paribus effect of globalization in terms of trade and financial 
openness on inflation and the output-inflation tradeoff.  
We find several interesting results: Countries which are more open both to international 
trade and financial flows show lower rates of inflation, and – at the same time – a larger 
output-inflation tradeoff. This is at odds with the role of trade in a standard Barro-Gordon 
framework as considered by Romer (1993) or Lane (1997); in these modes, for trade to have a 
negative effect on inflation, it would have to be associated with a smaller output-inflation 
tradeoff. Moreover, these models do not explain why financial openness should be negatively 
related to inflation.  
Our results support a recent strand of the new Keynesian literature, in particular the 
models by Daniels and VanHoose (2005) and Razin and Loungani (2007). Both models 
predict a negative effect of globalization on inflation and a positive effect on the output-  30
inflation trade off. In Daniels and VanHoose (2005) the transmission channel is that trade 
reduces the pricing power of firms, and thereby also the output effects of a surprise inflation. 
In Razin and Loungani (2007), both financial and trade openness reduce the relative weight 
attached to the output gap in the representative households utility based loss function. As a 
result, globalization tends to induce policy maker’s, guided by the representative household’s 
objective function, to putting greater emphasis on reducing inflation than on narrowing output 
gaps. This model receives strong support through our results since the link between financial 
openness and inflation (the output-inflation tradeoff) is particularly robust.  
The effects of globalization on inflation are also economically significant. Increasing 
trade or financial openness by one percentage point reduces average inflation by -.2 to -0.4 
percent. The magnitude of this effect is roughly in line with previous studies, bearing in mind 
that most of them considered only the effect of trade but omitted financial openness.  
A further important result, which is in contrast to previous studies using data up to the 
end of the 1980s, is that we do not find a robust relation between openness and inflation for 
our subsample of 25 OECD countries. The apparently opposite views by Rogoff and Ball 
quoted in the introduction can be reconciled with this evidence. Since the global disinflation 
over the last decades is mainly due to the improved inflation performance of developing 
rather than the highly developed countries, Rogoff is certainly right to stress the disciplinating 
force globalization has exerted on central bank behaviour. Ball, though referring to Rogoff, 
considers primarily the US experience and that of OECD countries, where no empirical link 
between inflation and openness can be identified. At least since the mid 1980s, these countries 
appear to have resolved the time inconsistency problem by creating an institutional 
framework supporting central bank behaviour that is uncoupled from otherwise relevant 
determinants of the inflation bias.  
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Appendix 
A1. Data Description 
Our final sample comprises 91 countries, for which the main variables are available, and 
refers mainly to the period 1985-2004. Data on inflation, nominal and real GDP, and import 
shares are taken from the Word Development Indicators. Initial real GDP per worker in 1985 
and real openness (i.e. real exports plus real imports over real GDP) are taken from the Penn 
World Tables 6.2. Financial openness is calculated from data by Lane and Milesi-Feretti 
(2006). Data on central bank independence is from Cukierman et al. (1992) for the period 
1950 to 1989, and from Polillo and Guillén (2005) for the period 1990 to 2000. The 
geographical trade instrument is from Frankel and Rose (2002) and refers to 1990. Data on 
political instability (indicator of government crises) is from Aisen and Veiga (2005). Data on 
capital and current account restrictions are from Quinn (1997). I wish to thank Dan Quinn and 
Jose Veiga for sharing their data with me. I also wish to thank Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew 
Rose, Alex Cukierman as well as Simon Polillo and Mauro Guillén for making their data 
available through their webpage.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables 
a) Basic statistics  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
(1)  π  9.82 5.59  45.39 1.26 9.96  91 
(2)  θ  0.31 0.20 1.00  -0.45 0.33  91 
(3)  OPEN
Trade  0.72 0.61 3.31 0.20 0.44  91 
(4)  Imports  0.30 0.26 1.48 0.09 0.18  91 
(5)  OPEN
Fin  1.69 1.37 6.95 0.39 1.26  91 
(6)  Capital  65.69 66.88  100.00 20.31 23.02  73 
(7)  Current  71.58 73.44  100.00 25.00 21.56  73 
(8)  Z
Open   0.21 0.16 0.98 0.02 0.16  91 
(9)  CBI  0.44 0.45 0.77 0.14 0.15  50 
(10)  PINST  0.15 0.07 1.47 0.00 0.23  91 
(11)  RGDPWOK  21793 15457 81060  1363 18947  91 
             
b)  Correlations  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
(1)  lnπ  1.00 -0.55 -0.38 -0.22 -0.42 -0.41 -0.35 -0.32 -0.08  0.08 -0.45
(2)  θ    1.00 0.26 0.21 0.43 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.04  -0.02 0.43
(3)  OPEN
Trade     1.00 0.91 0.57 0.21 0.21 0.71  -0.12  -0.16 0.30
(4)  Imports      1.00 0.48 0.15 0.15 0.74  -0.08  -0.20 0.19
(5)  OPEN
Fin       1.00 0.48 0.43 0.57  0.10  -0.05 0.39
(6)  Capital        1.00 0.85 0.42  0.31  0.00 0.64
(7)  Current         1.00 0.35  0.31  0.00 0.61
(8)  Z
Open           1.00  0.11  -0.02 0.36
(9)  CBI           1.00  0.09 0.41
(10)  PINST            1.00 0.03
(11) lnRGDPWOK             1 . 0 0
Notes: A description of the data and a list of countries are provided in the Appendix.   37
Table 2. Inflation and Trade Openness  
Dependent variable is lnπ 
 LS  IV    LS  IV    LS  IV  2SLS 
Constant  -1.534  0.337  1.631 2.053   3.952
** 6.843
*** 6.338
***
  (0.745)  (0.269)  (1.144)  (1.258)   (1.865)  (1.880)  (1.985) 
OPEN
Trade  -0.928
*** -1.651
***   -0.707
*** -0.944
***  -0.601
*** -1.565
*** -1.397
***
  (0.188)  (-3.561)   (0.176)  (0.363)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.470) 
lnPop  0.015  -0.012  -0.055 -0.058   -0.213
*** -0.170
* -0.178
** 
  (0.070)  (-0.149)   (0.075)  (0.077)   (0.072)  (0.088)  (0.082) 
lnArea -0.056  -0.145
*  -0.031 -0.061    0.026 -0.181
* -0.145 
  (0.064)  (-1.743)   (0.059)  (0.079)   (0.069)  (0.095)  (0.089) 
PINST       0.297 0.246   0.385 0.111 0.159 
       (0.364)  (0.363)   (0.357)  (0.345)  (0.347) 
lnRGDPWOK       -0.323
*** -0.307
***  -0.534
*** -0.491
*** -0.499
***
       (0.088)  (0.094)   (0.130)  (0.151)  (0.144) 
CBI             1.127
* 0.315  0.457 
              (0.638) (0.865) (0.797) 
Hausman (p-value) 
1)   (0.070)     (0.466)     (0.072)  (0.021) 
OID (p-value) 
2)                (0.512) 
IQual  (F-Test)   32.049     26.208     12.719  8.661 
Adj. R
2  0.123     0.243     0.383     
SEE 0.867  0.903  0.806 0.810   0.672 0.766 0.737 
Observations 91    91    47 
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level; heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.  IV estimates use Z
Open as instrument for Open
Trade. 2SLS estimate uses Current as 
additional instrument. 
1) Heteroscedasticity-robust Hausman test for endogeneity (H0: Open
Trade (Current) 
is exogenous). 
2) Heteroscedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: Z
Open, Current are 
valid instruments).   38
Table 3. Inflation and Financial Openness  
Dependent variable is lnπ 
 LS  IV    LS  IV    LS  IV  2SLS 
Constant  -2.365
***  -1.161   0.604 0.752   2.759
* 3.367
** 3.190
** 
  (0.635) (0.898)   (1.070)  (1.104)    (1.491) (1.456) (1.423) 
OPEN
Fin  -0.303
*** -0.534
***   -0.212
*** -0.350
***   -0.245
*** -0.488
*** -0.417
*** 
  (0.066) (0.124)   (0.068)  (0.129)    (0.067) (0.156) (0.111) 
lnPop  0.027 0.009   -0.047  -0.047    -0.210
*** -0.180
* -0.189
** 
  (0.071) (0.076)   (0.075)  (0.076)    (0.074) (0.093) (0.086) 
lnArea  -0.011 -0.063   0.012 -0.018    0.040  -0.074 -0.041 
  (0.062) (0.071)   (0.056)  (0.067)    (0.055) (0.090) (0.069) 
PINST      0.406  0.378    0.478  0.401  0.423 
      (0.374)  (0.379)    (0.367)  (0.427)  (0.408) 
lnRGDPWOK      -0.296
*** -0.246    -0.442
*** -0.323
** -0.358
*** 
      (0.097)  (0.108)    (0.128)  (0.156)  (0.141) 
CBI            1.392
** 1.151  1.221
* 
            (0.599)  (0.814)  (0.722) 
Hausman (p-value) 
1)    (0.047)     (0.220)      (0.109) (0.078) 
OID (p-value) 
2)              (0.452) 
IQual  (F-Test)   25.514     16.282    10.256  9.368 
Adj. R
2  0.148     0.240     0.445     
SEE  0.855 0.897   0.807  0.822    0.638 0.710 0.675 
Observations    91     91     47   
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level; heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.  IV estimates use Z
Open as instrument for Open
Fin. 2SLS estimate uses Capital as 
additional instrument. 
1) Heteroscedasticity-robust Hausman test for endogeneity (H0: Open
Fin (Capital) 
is exogenous). 
2) Heteroscedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: Z
Open, Capital are valid 
instruments).   39
Table 4. Inflation, Trade and Financial Openness  
Dependent variable is lnπ 
 LS  2SLS
3)   LS  IV
4)   LS  IV
4) 2SLS
5) 
Constant  1.441 1.768   0.967  1.103    3.394
** 4.194
*** 3.843
** 
  (1.173) (2.060)   (1.060)  (1.110)    (1.485) (1.470) (1.476) 
OPEN
Trade  -0.509
*** -0.208    -0.207
*** -0.255
***   -0.227
*** -0.372
*** -0.308
*** 
  (0.188) (0.866)   (0.055)  (0.089)    (0.055) (0.103) (0.067) 
OPEN
Fin  -0.149
**  -0.278   Restr. Restr.   Restr.  Restr.  Restr. 
  (0.070) (0.253)              
lnPop  -0.053 -0.095   -0.049  -0.050    -0.202
*** -0.178
** -0.188
** 
  (0.074) (0.078)   (0.074)  (0.074)    (0.071) (0.082) (0.076) 
lnArea  -0.039 -0.011   -0.013  -0.030    0.000  -0.100 -0.056 
  (0.059) (0.081)   (0.058)  (0.069)    (0.058) (0.082) (0.063) 
PINST  0.309 0.418   0.362  0.343    0.419 0.332 0.370 
  (0.362) (0.397)   (0.367)  (0.369)    (0.358) (0.389) (0.374) 
lnRGDPWOK -0.283
*** -0.306
***   -0.283
*** -0.263
**   -0.441
*** -0.363
*** -0.397
*** 
  (0.096) (0.120)   (0.096)  (0.102)    (0.128) (0.141) (0.127) 
CBI            1.219
* 0.952  1.069 
            (0.607)  (0.770)  (0.683) 
Hausman (p-value) 
1)    (0.910)     (0.530)    (0.172) (0.224) 
OID (p-value) 
2)   (0.186)              
IQual (F-Test)    9.626, 11.545      24.683      16.145  9.154 
Adj. R
2  0.261     0.259     0.462     
SEE  0.796 0.722   0.797  0.800    0.628 0.663 0.639 
Observations    91    73     91     47 
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level; heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
1) Heteroscedasticity-robust Hausman test for endogeneity (H0:  Open
Trade  is 
exogenous). 
2) Heteroscedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: Z
Open, Current are valid 
instruments). 
3) Z
Open, Capital, and Current used as instruments for Open
Trade and Open
Fin. 
4) Z
Open used as 
instrument for Open
Trade and Open
Fin (restricted model). 
5) Z
Open, Capital, and Current used as instruments 
for Open
Trade and Open
Fin (restricted model).   40
Table 5. The Output-Inflation Tradeoff, Trade and Financial Openness  
Dependent variable is θ 
 LS  2SLS
3)   LS  IV
4)   LS  IV
4) 2SLS
5) 
Constant  -0.206 -0.102   0.002 -0.116    0.177  -0.118 -0.628 
  (0.358) (0.547)   (0.246)  (0.355)    (0.493) (0.640) (0.740) 
OPEN
Trade  0.062 -0.274    0.079
*** 0.094
***   0.060
*** 0.085
* 0.128
** 
  (0.101) (0.334)   (0.018)  (0.035)    (0.025) (0.043) (0.053) 
OPEN
Fin  0.110
*** 0.246
**    Restr. Restr.   Restr.  Restr.  Restr. 
  (0.025) (0.096)              
lnPop  0.036 0.027   0.019  0.021    -0.016  -0.014  -0.012 
  (0.027) (0.029)   (0.026)  (0.025)    (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) 
lnArea  -0.004 -0.004   0.008 0.012   0.032  0.047  0.074 
  (0.025) (0.042)   (0.021)  (0.026)    (0.030) (0.042) (0.046) 
π          -0.463 -0.440   -1.438
** -1.340
** -1.171
** 
         (0.326) (0.347)  (0.599)  (0.565)  (0.573) 
 σ
AD         -1.200
* -1.177
*    -0.931 -0.852 -0.717 
         (0.674) (0.676)  (0.676)  (0.662)  (0.652) 
CBI             0.008  0.017  0.033 
             (0.220)  (0.230)  (0.260) 
Hausman (p-value) 
1)    (0.097)     (0.546)    (0.458) (0.057) 
OID (p-value) 
2)    (0.806)            (0.163) 
IQual (F-Test)     10.792, 16.915       33.455      14.938  8.030 
Adj. R
2  0.163     0.340     0.404  0.392   
SEE 0.3  0.347    0.267  0.268    0.261 0.264 0.279 
Observations 91 73    91    47 
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level; heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
1) Heteroscedasticity-robust Hausman test for endogeneity (H0:  Open
Trade  is 
exogenous). 
2) Heteroscedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: Z
Open, Current are valid 
instruments). 
3) Z
Open, Capital, and Current used as instruments for Open
Trade and Open
Fin. 
4) Z
Open used as 
instrument for Open
Trade and Open
Fin (restricted model). 
5) Z
Open, Capital, and Current used as instruments 
for Open
Trade and Open
Fin (restricted model).   41 
Table 6. Robustness Analysis: Inflation and Openness (Model (1)) 
  Open
Trade in 
Imports 
Open
Fin without 
FDIs 
Restricted 
variant  CPI inflation   Subperiods 
1985-1994    1995-2004 
Excluding high 
inflation countries
OECD  
Countries 
Constant  2.226  0.997  1.286 1.545 0.817 1.023  0.465  14.860 
  (1.378)  (1.126)  (1.121) (1.281) (1.528) (0.944)  (1.076)  (2.602) 
OPEN
Trade  -2.073
**   -0.411
** -0.312
*** -0.439
** -0.210
*** -0.278
*** -0.063 
  (0.904)   (0.159) (0.105) (0.196) (0.073)  (0.087)  (0.086) 
OPEN
Fin   -0.513
**  restr. restr. restr.  restr. restr.  restr. 
    (0.214)          
lnPop  -0.021  -0.067  -0.061 -0.027 -0.045 -0.131
* -0.001  -0.169
* 
  (0.085)  (0.079)  (0.076) (0.084) (0.094) (0.070)  (0.069)  (0.081) 
lnArea  -0.077  -0.019  -0.031 -0.075 -0.052  0.019  -0.083  0.105 
  (0.090)  (0.070)  (0.070) (0.078) (0.087) (0.059)  (0.065)  (0.112) 
PINST  0.145  0.543  0.477 0.459 0.202 0.499  0.248  0.494
** 
  (0.397)  (0.405)  (0.389) (0.434) (0.359) (0.335)  (0.348)  (0.218) 
lnRGDPWOK -0.345
*** -0.247
** -0.269
** -0.261
** -0.161  -0.263
*** -0.178
* -1.693
*** 
  (0.092)  (0.116)  (0.108) (0.122) (0.119) (0.089)  (0.097)  (0.236) 
Hausman (p-value)
 1)  (0.057)  (0.090)  (0.141) (0.363) (0.335) (0.435)  (0.407)  (0.953) 
IQual  (F-Test)  33.782  9.010  13.852 24.683 13.990 25.208  21.844  6.983 
SEE 0.862  0.858  0.830  0.881  0.937 0.791  0.716  0.444 
Observations  91 90  90 90 88  91  85  25 
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level; heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. IV-estimates use Z
Open as instrument 
for Open
Trade and Open
Fin. 
1) Heteroscedasticity-robust Hausman test for endogeneity (H0: Open
Fin (Open
Trade) is exogenous).   42
Appendix Tables 
 
Table A2.1 The Output-Inflation Tradeoff and Trade Openness  
Dependent variable is θ 
 LS  IV    LS  IV    LS  IV  2SLS 
Constant  -0.058 -1.094   0.339 -0.396    1.009
* -0.284 -0.816 
  (0.373) (0.581)   (0.321)  (0.503)    (0.554) (0.852) (1.034) 
OPEN
Trade  0.225
** 0.626
***  0.103  0.385
**  -0.039  0.328  0.479 
  (0.093) (0.220)   (0.077)  (0.180)    (0.096) (0.231) (0.303) 
lnPop  0.034 0.049   0.016  0.028    -0.019  -0.022  -0.023 
  (0.028) (0.038)   (0.026)  (0.031)    (0.025) (0.030) (0.035) 
lnArea  -0.009  0.040   -0.005  0.027   -0.010  0.061  0.091 
  (0.026) (0.037)   (0.024)  (0.032)    (0.031) (0.054) (0.063) 
π      -0.926
** -0.740    -2.458
*** -2.019
** -1.838
** 
      (0.419)  (0.468)    (0.880)  (0.814)  (0.893) 
 σ
AD      -1.139
*  -1.024    -0.836 -0.852 -0.858 
      (0.578)  (0.632)    (0.958)  (0.758)  (0.822) 
CBI            -0.032  0.232  0.341 
            (0.259)  (0.293)  (0.328) 
Hausman (p-value) 
1)   (0.023)     (0.052)    (0.069) (0.027) 
OID (p-value) 
2)              (0.129) 
IQual  (F-Test)   32.049     27.598    10.343  5.777 
Adj. R
2  0.049     0.268     0.376     
SEE  0.320 0.349   0.281  0.297    0.267 0.301 0.332 
Observations    91     91     47 
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level; heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.  IV estimates use Z
Open as instrument for Open
Trade. 2SLS estimate uses Current as 
additional instrument. 
1) Heteroscedasticity-robust Hausman test for endogeneity (H0:  Open
Trade  and 
(Current) is exogenous). 
2) Heteroscedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions (H0:  Z
Open, 
Current are valid instruments). 
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Table A2.2 The Output-Inflation Tradeoff and Financial Openness  
Dependent variable is  θ 
 LS  IV    LS  IV    LS  IV  2SLS 
Constant  -0.087  -0.526   0.123  -0.025   0.223  -0.029  -0.313 
  (0.260)  (0.416)   (0.215)  (0.324)   (0.427)  (0.594)  (0.635) 
OPEN
Fin  0.118
*** 0.203
***   0.095
*** 0.123
***   0.080
** 0.110
*** 0.145
** 
  (0.022)  (0.059)   (0.020)  (0.046)   (0.030)  (0.054)  (0.061) 
lnPop  0.034  0.041    0.017 0.020    -0.014 -0.012 -0.009 
  (0.026)  (0.028)   (0.025)  (0.025)   (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.026) 
lnArea  -0.010  0.009   0.002  0.008   0.028  0.041  0.057 
  (0.023)  (0.030)   (0.020)  (0.025)   (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
π  -0.010  0.023   -0.477  -0.446   -1.430
** -1.338
** -1.659
** 
  (0.023)  (-0.449)   (0.322)  (0.348)   (0.568)  (0.537)  (0.681) 
 σ
AD        -1.220
* -1.191
*    -0.871 -0.777 -0.582 
        (0.670)  (0.681)    (0.666)  (0.644)  (0.579) 
CBI              -0.043  -0.054  -0.061 
              (0.217)  (0.224)  (0.241) 
Hausman (p-value) 
1)      (0.068)     (0.414)    (0.470) (0.114) 
OID (p-value) 
2)                 (0.086) 
IQual (F-Test)     25.514      23.622      10.519  8.632 
Adj. R
2  0.169     0.350     0.428     
SEE  0.299  0.315    0.265 0.267   0.256  0.259  0.267 
Observations    91     91     47 
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level; heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.  IV-estimates use Z
Open as instrument for Open
Fin. 2SLS estimate uses Capital as 
additional instrument. 
1) Heteroscedasticity-robust Hausman test for endogeneity (H0: Open
Fin (Capital) 
is exogenous). 
2) Heteroscedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: Z
Open, Capital are valid 
instruments). 
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Table A2.3 Robustness Analysis: The Openness-Inflation Tradeoff and Openness  
  Imports as  
Open
Trade 
Open
Fin without 
FDIs  Restricted variant  Subperiods 
1985-1994           1995-2004 
Excluding high 
inflation countries
OECD 
Rich  
Constant  -0.378 -0.020 -0.077 -0.076 0.311 0.062 -0.203 
  (0.504) (0.334) (0.350) (0.562)  (0.421)  (0.357) (0.813) 
OPEN
Trade  0.901
**   0.143
** 0.130
* 0.049  0.074
** 0.047 
 (0.445)    (0.057)  (0.077)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.052) 
OPEN
Fin   0.169
** restr.  restr.  restr.  restr.  restr. 
   (0.069)           
lnPop  0.015 0.021 0.020 0.048  0.037  0.021 0.057 
  (0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.033)  (0.040)  (0.026) (0.042) 
lnArea  0.037 0.007 0.012  -0.008  -0.031  0.008 0.016 
  (0.036) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.028) (0.051) 
π  -1.061
**  -0.670 -0.732 -0.271  -0.356  -1.151
** -0.757 
  (0.452) (0.481) (0.463) (0.233)  (0.262)  (0.545) (0.607) 
σ
AD  -0.844 -1.240
* -1.177
* -1.842
*** -0.922  -1.430  -2.127 
  (0.645) (0.684) (0.661) (0.630)  (0.770)  (0.810) (1.296) 
Hausman (p-
value)
 1)  (0.038) (0.180) (0.261) (0.320)  (0.611)  (0.880) (0.956) 
IQual  (F-Test)  28.412 14.312 20.068 19.568  30.929  28.271  9.089 
SEE  0.298 0.279 0.273 0.371 0.374 0.264  0.239 
Observations  91 91 91  91  91 85 25 
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level; heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. IV-estimates use Z
Open as instrument 
for Open
Trade and Open
Fin. 
1) Heteroscedasticity-robust Hausman test for endogeneity (H0: Open
Fin (Open
Trade) is exogenous).  45
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Figure 1. Trade Openness and Inflation
Financial Openness (OPEN
Fin) 
Figure 2. Financial Openness and Inflation
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